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Abstract
Background: In 2006, a number of changes in the Dutch health insurance system came into effect. In this new
system mobility of insured is important. The idea is that insured switch insurers because they are not satisfied with
quality of care and the premium of their insurance. As a result, insurers will in theory strive for a better balance
between price and quality. The Dutch changes have caught the attention, internationally, of both policy makers
and researchers. In our study we examined switching behaviour over three years (2007-2009). We tested if there
are differences in the numbers of switchers between groups defined by socio-demographic and health
characteristics and between the general population and people with chronic illness or disability. We also looked at
reasons for (not-)switching and at perceived barriers to switching.
Methods: Switching behaviour and reasons for (not-)switching were measured over three years (2007-2009) by
sending postal questionnaires to members of the Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel and of the National Panel of
people with Chronic illness or Disability. Data were available for each year and for each panel for at least 1896
respondents - a response of between 71% and 88%.
Results: The percentages of switchers are low; 6% in 2007, 4% in 2008 and 3% in 2009. Younger and higher
educated people switch more often than older and lower educated people and women switch more often than
men. There is no difference in the percentage of switchers between the general population and people with
chronic illness or disability. People with a bad self-perceived health, and chronically ill and disabled, perceive more
barriers to switching than others.
Conclusion: The percentages of switchers are comparable to the old system. Switching is not based on quality of
care and thus it can be questioned whether it will lead to a better balance between price and quality. Although
there is no difference in the frequency of switching among the chronically ill and disabled and people with a bad
self-perceived health compared to others, they do perceive more barriers to switching. This suggests there are
inequalities in the new system.
Background
Since the 1990s the Dutch health care system has been
in a process of transition from a mainly supply- orien-
tated system towards a more demand-orientated system
with managed competition. The general idea behind
managed competition in health care is that it leads to
better accessibility, higher quality and affordable prices
in health care. Many other countries have introduced
some form of managed competition in their health care
system [1,2], for instance Germany, Switzerland, Bel-
gium and the United States [3-6].
In the Netherlands a major step towards a demand-
orientated system with managed competition was taken
on 1 January 2006 by introducing a new health insur-
ance law. In the old system of health insurance most
people were publicly insured (about 67% of the Dutch
population with an income below a certain maximum)
and other people were privately insured. Insurance was
not obliged for those who did not qualify for public
insurance. In the new system of health insurance, there
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insurance is obligatory for everyone who lives in the
Netherlands or pays tax on earnings in the Netherlands.
Complementary insurance is not obligatory. The health-
care covered by the basic package includes among
others, care by general practitioners and specialists, hos-
pital care and medicines. The complementary insurance
covers for example, dental care, manual therapy and
glasses. Every year, during an annual enrolment period,
every insured person can switch their insurer and/or
their insurance plan. In this article we focus on switch-
ing from insurer.
This mobility of the insured is important in the new
health care system. The idea is that if the insured switch
and they do this because they are dissatisfied with the
premium and quality of care of their insurer, this will
f o r c ei n s u r e r st oi m p r o v et h e i rb a l a n c eb e t w e e np r i c e
and quality. Although there are many different quality
aspects, such as level of service and coverage of the
insurance package, the assumption of the health insur-
ance system is that people switch because they are dissa-
tisfied with their quality of care that is contracted by the
health insurance company and premium. So the number
of switchers, their characteristics and the reasons for
switching are important in the new health insurance
system.
The assumptions behind the new health insurance sys-
tem are that people want to switch insurer and that the
opportunity to switch is the same for everybody. The
new system of health insurance is explicitly designed to
create the opportunity to switch health insurer for all
people and to the same extent. All insurers are obliged
to accept everyone for the basic package. However, for
complementary insurance, insurance companies can
refuse applicants. Consequently, risk selection might
play a role on the level of the complementary insurance.
Although the insured are allowed to have their basic
insurance with a different insurer than their comple-
mentary insurance, the possibility of risk selection
through the complementary insurance might restrain
the insured from switching. It is unlikely that the
insured will only switch their basic insurance as it is
(administratively) unattractive. If people have their basic
insurance at another insurer than their complementary
insurance, they have to register at two different insurers.
If they have to declare health related costs, they will
have to figure out what is covered by which of their
insurances. In general, insurers discourage people from
taking out their basic insurance with a different insurer.
For example they will ask a higher premium for comple-
mentary insurance if they do not already have their
basic insurance with the same insurer [7]. In order to
decrease incentives for risk selection for the basic insur-
ance, health care insurers share the risks related to
certain health characteristics and age by a system of risk
equalization [8]. There is financial compensation for
insurers who accept insured people with a higher risk
for the basic assurance. These may include the elderly,
chronically ill and other people who have higher health
costs. In this way, risk adjustment removes the financial
incentive to select according to risks or to avoid insur-
ing the sick [9]. Therefore, risk selection should not be
a barrier to switching.
The international literature shows that, usually, few
people switch health insurance [4]. In the old system in
the Netherlands, approximately 3% of the publicly
insured and 6% of the privately insured switched each
year [10,11]. The percentage of switchers in the general
population at the introduction of the new insurance sys-
tem was rather high (21%) compared to the number of
switchers in the old system [12,13].
An important question is whether the high number of
switchers in 2006 was a unique event, or not. There are
several reasons why in 2006 many people took the
opportunity to switch insurance company. There was a
lot of media attention given to the introduction of the
new health insurance law compared to the years after,
which might have led to a higher number of switchers
in 2006. Furthermore, in the old system people with pri-
vate insurance could not easily switch insurer because of
barriers like risk selection and premium differentiation.
In the new system switching was much easier for them.
So, in 2006 many privately insured people may have
taken the chance to switch. Last but not least, in the
first year of the new system, insurance companies were
more generous in accepting people for complementary
insurance than in the years after [14].
Although there were reasons to expect that the num-
ber of switchers in the years after the introduction of
the new system would not be as high as in 2006, we
expected it to be higher than in the old system. Switch-
ing is easier than in the old system, especially for certain
groups such as people with chronic illness or disability
who had a private insurance under the old system.
The exact percentage of ‘switchers’ needed for the
market to work as intended is difficult to determine. If
too many people switch insurer this could also have
negative effects. Collective costs will increase, which in
turn could be the cause of increased premiums. Further-
more, insurance companies need the money from those
who stay to accomplish desired improvements. However,
it is also argued that the mere threat of switching is
enough to force insurers to improve. Hirschman [15]
distinguished two ways in which consumers can express
their dissatisfaction with an organization: exit and voice.
Voice means that people express their dissatisfaction,
but that they do not leave the organization. For insurers,
voice is important, as it provides them with information
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money from the people who did not switch to accom-
plish these improvements. These insured people provide
information on both quality of care and premium in
order to reach the intended goals. However, it can be
questioned whether people will ever use voice when
switching is relatively easy. Voice probably works bests
when groups of people complain and there is a threat of
losing a large number of people, which can be the case
in collectives. Collective insurance contracts are an
interesting aspect of the new Dutch health insurance
system. Any group of people, e.g. united through their
work place, a sports association or patient organization,
c a nt a k eo u ti n s u r a n c ea tad i s c o u n to fam a x i m u mo f
10% on the basic insurance package if an insurance
company is interested in offering a collective contract.
However, in order to make the system work it is not
only important that people switch between health
insurers, it is also important to know why they are
switching. If people only switch because of the pre-
mium, they will not provide insurers with information
on the quality of care. Consequently, insurers will then
compete on the premium and not on the quality of
care. Therefore, it is also interesting to look at the char-
acteristics of switchers and the reasons for switching. In
2006 the quality of care was not an important reason
for switching; the most reported reason for switching
was a collective offer [12,13]. Collective offers are prob-
ably an important reason for switching because of
the discount on the premium. Furthermore, choosing
between collective offers makes the choice situation less
complex since there are less insurance policies to choose
from. Differences regarding quality of care are not likely
for collective contracts through employers since employ-
ers mainly emphasise price of collective contracts. Most
collective contracts are employer based. Patients’ collec-
tives, in particular, emphasise service and quality of care
aspects of collective contracts. However, only a small
percentage of people opt for these collective contracts.
Differences in quality of care between collective contract
is therefore not likely to be important in the decision of
insured.
Are the reasons why people switch still a collective
o f f e ra n dl o w e rp r e m i u m ,o rd os w i t c h e r sa l s ot a k e
quality aspects into account? The reasons for switching
might differ between groups. People with chronic illness
or disability have substantial experience with health care
and are able to judge the level of service and the quality
of care. Therefore these groups might base their choice
to switch more often than the general population on
these aspects. In addition, people with chronic illness or
disability probably have more informed knowledge of
what kind of care they may need for their illness and
therefore know what they need insurance for. Therefore,
the content of the insurance package is more important
for them than it is for the general population.
Although the reasons for switching might differ
between groups, the question is whether the numbers of
switchers differ between groups. The new insurance sys-
tem was explicitly designed to create equal opportunities
to switch health insurer for all people and to the same
extent. However, in 2006, people with chronic illness or
disability switched health insurer less often than the
general population [12]. This difference between the
general population and people with chronic illness or
disability could be explained by the fact that older peo-
ple and lower educated people tend to switch less often
and it is these groups who are over-represented among
people with chronic illness or disability. These differ-
ences disappeared when corrected for age, sex, educa-
tion and self-perceived health. Also empirical studies in
several countries have shown that younger people,
highly educated people and people in relatively good
health, switch health insurer more often [12,16-21].
These differences in switching behaviour between these
groups can be seen as a sign of the existence of inequal-
ities and are often explained in terms of barriers. Older
people, people with a relatively bad health and chroni-
cally ill and disabled people may perceive more barriers
to switching, because these individuals want to have cer-
tainty about their continued coverage for health care
[22,23]. Higher educated people might be more willing
to take risks, and for them it will probably be easier to
process all the relevant information on the available
health insurers, making it easier for them to choose
another health insurer [24]. Therefore, inequalities
might not only become visible in differences in the
numbers of switchers between different groups, but also
in differences in the extent to which people perceive
barriers to switching. If some people do perceive more
barriers than others, this also might point towards
inequalities in the new health insurance system.
In this article we focus on differences in switching
between groups of insured people, the reasons for (not)
switching and perceived barriers to switching. We examine
whether there are differences in switching behaviour and
the reasons for (not) switching between the general popu-
lation and a specific group of insured, namely people with
a chronic illness or disability. We also look at differences
between groups defined in terms of socio-demographic
and health characteristics. The main focus is on differ-
ences between groups over the three years 2007 to 2009.
In this article three questions will be answered:
1. How many insured people switched insurer in the
years following the introduction of the new system
(2007-2009) and are there differences between the popu-
lation categories, defined in terms of socio-demographic
and health characteristics?
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base their choice on the premium and the quality of
care?
3. What are the reasons for not switching? Are there
groups of people who perceive barriers more often than
other groups?
Hypotheses
In general, we hypothesize that people who are relatively
frequent users of care for example, women [25] the
elderly and lower educated people, switch less often
than people who use health care less frequently. There-
fore, we hypothesize that:
aI nt h eg e n e r a lp o p u l a t i o np e o p l es w i t c hm o r eo f t e n
than people who are chronically ill and disabled
b Younger people switch more often than older people
c Higher educated people switch more often than
lower educated people
d Healthier people switch more often than unhealthier
people
e Men switch more often than women
In addition, we hypothesize that people with chronic
illness or disability perceive more barriers to switching
than the general population.
Methods
We sent questionnaires to members of the Dutch
Health Care Consumer Panel, a cross section of the
Dutch population and the National Panel of people with
Chronic illness or Disability (NPCD) in three consecu-
tive years (2007, 2008 and 2009). The questionnaires
were returned by 71% to 81% of the members of the
Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel and by 82% to 88%
of the members of the NPCD. In Table 1 an overview is
given of the number of questionnaires that were sent
and returned each year and of the response percentages.
The protection of the collected data from both panels
was laid down in privacy regulations, safeguarding ethi-
cal consent, and registered with the Dutch Data Protec-
tion Authority (nr. 1262949 and nr. 1283171).
Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel
The Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel [26] consists of
about 3000 people aged 18 years and older. The panel is
representative of the general population for age and sex.
Members of the panel receive a questionnaire four times
a year and can quit the panel any time. Every two years,
one third of the panel members is renewed. This
renewal ensures that the panel remains a cross-section
of the population, that members do not develop specific
knowledge of, and attention for, health care issues, and
that no “questionnaire-fatigue” occurs. New members
of the panel are sampled from the general population.
Sampled people receive an information letter about the
panel and are called within a week after receiving that
letter. If they are interested they receive first a question-
naire on background characteristics. When that ques-
tionnaire is returned they are considered members of
the panel.
National Panel of people with Chronic illness or Disability
(NPCD)
The NPCD is a nationwide prospective panel-study in
the Netherlands [27,28]. It has been set up to provide
information about the consequences of chronic illness
and disability from the patient’s perspective. The panel
consists of about 3500 people, aged 15 years and over
with one or more medically diagnosed chronic disease(s)
and/or moderate to severe levels of physical disability.
The largest section of the panel’sm e m b e r s h i pi s
recruited from general practices (see [27] for more
details). Every year 500 new panel members with a
somatic chronic disease are selected via a standardized
procedure applied to a random sample of general prac-
tices throughout the country. This is done in order to
replace panel members who have dropped out or who
have participated for the maximum term of four years.
Additional panel members are selected from several
national population surveys on the basis of the presence
of a moderate to severe physical disability. Because of
this procedure, the NPCD can be considered a represen-
tative sample of the Dutch population of adult, non-
institutionalized (physically) chronically ill and/or dis-
abled persons.
Measurements
Among other things, we asked whether they switched
insurer (0 = did not switch, 1 = switched). Subsequently,
we asked switchers for the reasons for switching and
people who did not switch for the reasons for not
Table 1 The number of questionnaires that were sent and returned and the response percentages for each year for
the Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel and the National Panel of people with Chronic illness or Disability
Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel National Panel of people with Chronic illness or Disability
Sent Returned Response Sent Returned Response
2007 2876 2325 81% 3761 3310 88%
2008 2796 2107 75% 3917 3290 84%
2009 2655 1896 71% 3509 2877 82%
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dents could indicate which reasons applied to them (0 =
do not apply, 1 = apply). Among this list were four pos-
sible barriers people could perceive to switching. These
were: ‘ Ij u s tc o u l d n ’t be bothered to look for another
better or cheaper health care insurer’; ‘It is impossible
for me to change to another health care insurer, I
think’; ‘I am afraid they will not accept me for a comple-
mentary insurance’;a n d‘I fear getting into (administra-
tive) problems if I change to another health insurance
company’. These barriers were chosen using responses
in previous years.
Analyses
Composition of the two panels
The panels used for this article are not comparable on
age, sex and education (Table 2). The composition of
the Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel is more
younger, higher educated, and male, compared to the
NPCD panel. This pattern is consistent over the three
years. It might be that possible differences in switching
behaviour between the general population and people
with chronic illness or disability are not caused by
chronic illness or disability, but that they are caused by
differences in composition of the two panels with regard
to age, sex and education. To make both panels com-
parable on these three characteristics, a weight factor
for people with chronic illness or disability was used.
People who had one or more missing values on these
characteristics were removed, because weight factors
based on these characteristics could not be estimated (in
total 2,8% of the respondents were removed). We only
analysed results from people who were at least 18 years
old, since people below 18 years are not insured by
themselves. One variable with eighteen weight factors
was used for the combination of age (18-44; 45-65; 65
and older), sex (male; female) and education (lower;
intermediate; higher). To disentangle the differences in
switching behaviour that arec a u s e db yd i f f e r e n c e si n
socio-demographic composition and by chronic illness
or disability, we present both the unweighted and the
weighted percentages.
The description of respondents in percentages and of
the percentages of switchers, and reasons for not switch-
ing, are standardized to a standard population based on
the proportion between the number of chronically ill
people and the number of disabled people in the Dutch
population, by using a weight factor.
Testing for differences between groups
To test for differences between groups, we performed
logistic regression analyses and took into account the
differences in socio-demographic characteristics between
both panels by including age, sex, education and self-
perceived health status as predictors. For all analyses we
used the statistical program STATA version 10.1. We
took into account the dependency of our data (panel
members can be a respondent in more than one year)
by clustering on the unique personal panel identification
number.
Results
Switching health insurer
In the general population 6% switched insurer in 2007,
4% in 2008 and 3% in 2009 (Table 3). The weighted per-
centages for people with chronic illness or disability are
in all three years the same as the percentages of switch-
ers in the general population. Unweighted percentages
show that in 2007, 2008 and 2009 respectively 5%, 4%
and 2% of people with chronic illness or disability
switched insurer. These percentages of switchers are
remarkably lower than the percentages of switchers on
the introduction of the health insurance reform in 2006.
In that year 21% of the adult population switched health
insurer [12,13]. The percentage of switchers in 2007-
2009 is comparable to the percentage of switchers in the
situation before the health insurance reform, when it
was approximately 3% for the publicly insured and 6%
for the privately insured [10,11].
We performed logistic regression analyses to test for
differences in the numbers of switchers between popula-
tion categories, defined in socio-demographic and health
characteristics. We took into account the dependency of
our data by clustering on the unique personal panel
identification number. The results (see Table 4) show
that older people switch less often than younger people.
Women switch more often than men. Higher educated
people switch more often than lower educated people.
People with a good self-perceived health status do not
switch more often than people with a bad self-perceived
health status. The percentage of switchers in 2008 and
Table 2 Description of respondents: age, sex and
education in percentages
General
population
People with chronic illness
or disability
2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009
Age
18-44 25 23 20 12 10 9
45-64 48 48 49 42 41 42
≥ 65 27 28 31 47 48 49
Sex
Male 44 43 45 36 36 39
Education
Lower 22 22 22 46 45 42
Intermediate 48 47 47 39 39 40
Higher 31 31 31 15 16 18
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ference between the number of switchers in the the gen-
eral population and people with chronic illness or
disability.
Although there are no differences between the num-
bers of switchers in the general population and people
with chronic illness or disability, there might be differ-
ences in the reasons for not switching between the
groups. Therefore, we asked the switchers for their rea-
sons for switching and the people who did not switch
for their reasons for not switching.
Reasons for switching health insurer
We examined which reasons are reported for switching
and if there are differences between people with chronic
illness or disability on the one hand and the general popu-
lation on the other hand. As the number of switchers is
very low, we cannot perform reliable analyses on reasons
for switching to test for differences between groups. How-
ever, it is interesting to examine what reasons for switch-
ing are most often reported, and whether reported reasons
are consistent over time. Both for the general population
and for people with chronic illness or disability, we looked
at the top three most reported reasons for switching for
each year. The top three most reported reasons is highly
comparable for both groups and is comparable over the
years. For both groups dissatisfaction with the premium of
the package offered and a collective offer are in the top
three of the most reported reasons in all three years.
There was one exception, namely the collective offer is not
in the top three in 2008 for people with chronic illness or
disability. In two of the three years (2008 and 2009) dissa-
tisfaction with the coverage of the complementary insur-
ance is one of the three most reported reasons for both
groups. Other top three reasons for people with chronic
illness or disability are dissatisfaction with the coverage of
the package offered (2007) and dissatisfaction with the ser-
vice of the insurer (2008). Another top three reason for
the general population was dissatisfaction with the
premium of the collective offer (2007). Considerations of
the quality of care did not seem to play a role in switching
behaviour.
Reasons for not switching health insurer
We also asked people who did not switch for their
reasons for not switching. The reasons for not switching
were only asked for both panels in 2007 and 2008. Just
as was the case with the top three of the reasons for
switching, the top three most reported reasons for not
switching is highly comparable for both groups and over
the years. In both years and both groups, ‘I have been
with this health insurance company for such a long time
already’, and ‘I’m satisfied with the coverage of the pack-
age offered’ are two of the most reported reasons. For
the general population the reason, ‘I’m satisfied with the
service of my health insurer’, is in both years in the top
three and for the chonically ill and disabled, ‘I’ms a t i s -
fied with the coverage of the complementary insurance’,
is in both years in the top three.
Respondents could also report if they perceived bar-
riers to switching. In total we presented four barriers
to switching and respondents could indicate if these
barriers were a reason for them for not switching. In
Table 3 Percentage of people switching health insurer and their characteristics, weighted for age, sex, and education,
unweighted percentages between brackets
General population Chronically ill and disabled*
2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009
N = 2232 N = 2047 N = 1853 N = 3144 N = 3119 N = 2761
Percentage of switchers 6 4 3 6 (5) 4 (4) 3 (2)
Table 4 Logistic regression model for switching health
insurer (N = 14897)
Odds Ratio p-value
Age
18-44 Reference
45-64 0.63 0.000
≥ 65 0.47 0.000
Sex
Male Reference
Female 1.52 0.000
Education
Lower Reference
Intermediate 1.25 0.054
Higher 1.42 0.007
Self-perceived health status
Bad 0.83 0.178
Good 0.89 0.336
Very good Reference
Group
Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel 0.86 0.143
Chronically ill and Disabled Reference
Year
2007 Reference
2008 0.66 0.000
2009 0.45 0.000
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as the percentage of the general population and that of
people with chronic illness or disability that perceived
these barriers each year.
To test whether some groups of people, defined in
socio-demographic and health characteristics, perceive
these barriers more often than other groups of people,
we performed logistic regression analyses. We again
clustered on the unique personal panel identification
number. The results show (see table 6) that overall peo-
ple with a bad self-perceived health status and chroni-
cally ill and disabled people perceive more barriers than
people with a good self-perceived health status and peo-
ple in the general population.
Discussion
We have studied the switching behaviour of insured
people and the reasons for not switching over three
consecutive years (2007, 2008 and 2009), following the
introduction of the new health insurance system.
Numbers of switchers
F i r s tw el o o k e da tt h en u m b e r so fs w i t c h e r si nt h e s e
three years and at differences in numbers of switchers
between population categories, defined in socio-demo-
graphic and health characteristics. The numbers of
switchers were in all three years low compared to 2006
and comparable to the numbers of switchers in the old
health insurance system. Our general hypothesis that
Table 5 Perceived barriers to switching, unweighted percentages between brackets
General population Chronically ill and
disabled
2007 2008 2007 2008
N = 2112 N = 1971 N = 2957 N = 2984
1. I just couldn’t be bothered to look for another, better or cheaper health care insurer 15 19 19 (17) 17 (15)
2. It is impossible for me to change to another health care insurer, I think. 2 4 8 (9) 8 (8)
3. I am afraid they will not accept me for a complementary insurance. 5 6 14 (12) 16 (14)
4. I fear getting into (administrative) problems if I change to another health insurance company. 6 5 11 (11) 10 (10)
Table 6 Logistic regression model for perceived barriers to switching health insurer (N = 9880)
Could not be
bothered
Impossible for me
to
change
Afraid they will not
accept
me
Fear getting into
(administrative)
problems
Odds Ratio p-value Odds Ratio p-value Odds Ratio p-value Odds Ratio p-value
Age
18-44 reference reference reference reference
45-64 0.75 0.001 1.25 0.205 1.29 0.045 .93 0.591
≥ 65 0.67 0.000 1.14 0.460 0.74 0.030 .86 0.284
Sex
Male reference reference reference reference
Female 1.08 0.228 .94 0.534 0.82 0.017 .91 0.301
Education
Lower reference reference reference reference
Intermediate 1.39 0.000 .89 0.288 1.20 0.050 1.14 0.172
Higher 2.21 0.000 .88 0.361 1.29 0.032 1.29 0.033
Self-perceived health status
Bad 1.21 0.042 4.57 0.000 5.47 0.000 2.54 0.000
Good 1.10 0.255 1.91 0.003 2.12 0.000 1.54 0.002
Very good reference reference reference reference
Group
Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel 0.91 0.159 0.49 0.000 0.51 0.000 0.68 0.000
Chronicall-y ill and Disabled reference reference reference reference
Year
2007 Reference Reference Reference reference
2008 1.02 0.611 1.16 0.068 1.24 0.000 0.87 0.025
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less often than people who are less frequent users of
care is partly confirmed. Older people and lower edu-
cated people switch less often than others. We hypothe-
sized a difference between people with chronic illness or
disability and the general population. However, this
hypothesis was not confirmed in our research. The fact
that we did not find a difference in switching behaviour
between these two groups is comparable to a similar
study on switching behaviour in 2006 [12]. In that study
it was also found that there was no difference in switch-
ing behaviour between these groups when controlled for
age, education, and sex. We did not find a difference in
switching behaviour between people with a bad, com-
pared to a good, self-perceived health status. Obviously,
the opportunity to switch health insurer is the same for
these groups, which is one of the goals of the new sys-
tem. We expected that women would switch less often
than men, but found the reverse. The results from other
studies concerning the relationship between switching
behaviour and gender are inconsistent [17,19].
Reasons for switching
Second, we examined the reasons for switching. The
most reported reasons for switching were a collective
offer and dissatisfaction with the premium of the pack-
age offered, dissatisfaction with the coverage of the
complementary insurance, dissatisfaction with the cover-
age of the package offered, dissatisfaction with the ser-
vice of the insurer and dissatisfaction with the premium
of the collective offer. The quality of care did not seem
to play an important role in switching behaviour.
Reasons for not switching
Third, we looked at reasons for not switching and bar-
riers to switching. Furthermore, we examined if some
population categories perceived more barriers to switch-
ing than others. The most reported reasons for not
switching were: ‘I’m insured with the same insurer for
years’ and; ‘I’m satisfied with the coverage of the pack-
age offered’; ‘I’m satisfied with the service of my health
insurer’ and; ‘The coverage of the complementary insur-
ance’. More important, our hypothesis that chronically
ill and disabled, and people with a bad self-perceived
health status perceived more barriers to switching than
the general population and people with a good self-per-
ceived health status, has been confirmed.
What do our results mean for the success of the new
health insurance system? One of the goals of the new
health insurance system was to stimulate the mobility of
the insured. If insured people switch they should ideally
choose the best insurer, in terms of quality and pre-
mium. This should stimulate insurers to buy good care
at a good price. But is about 5% of the insured switching
each year enough? If too many people switch insurer,
this could also have negative effects. Collective costs will
increase, which in turn could be the cause of increased
premiums. In any case insurance companies need the
money from those who stay to accomplish desired
improvements.
The answer to the question of whether 5% switchers is
enough to reach the intended goals is also related to the
reasons that are reported for switching. For the intended
functioning of the new health insurance system it is
important that a part of the switchers chooses another
insurer because of the quality and premium of their cur-
rent insurer. But our results show that the quality
offered by the insurer is not the main reason for switch-
ing. The premium and a collective offer are more
important. So, it might be questioned whether the sig-
nals that are provided by the switchers are enough to
stimulate the insurers to strive for a better balance
between price and quality. Collectives could play a role,
s i n c et h e yn e g o t i a t ew i t hi n s u r a n c ec o m p a n i e s .H o w -
ever, other studies show that for the most sizeable col-
lectives, namely employers, the premium is most
important. Quality is less important in the negotiations
[29]. For individuals, collectives make choosing an
insurer easier, since collectives reduce the choice of
options: The number of insurers to choose from is
much larger than the number of collectives.
The fact that people do not mention quality of care as
a reason for switching is consistent with the finding that
people do not recognise differences between health
insurers with regard to their quality of care. The perfor-
mance of health plans is assessed annually in the Neth-
erlands using the standardized CQI
® health plan
instrument ‘Experiences with Health care and Health
Insurer’. Consumer Quality Index (CQ-index or CQI)
instruments assess the quality of health care seen from
the consumer’s perspective, and measure consumers’
experiences instead of inquiring about their satisfaction
[30-36]. These studies show that, from the insured per-
sons’ perspective, there is almost no difference between
insurers in their quality of care.
The new insurance system was explicitly designed to
create equal opportunities to switch health insurer for all
people - and to the same extent. Still, some groups could
benefit more from market competition than others, like
younger and higher educated people. Although we did
not find a difference in switching behaviour between the
general population and people with chronic illness or dis-
ability, chronically ill and disabled perceive more barriers
than others. The same was found when we compared
people with a bad self-perceived health status to people
with a good self-perceived health status. Although per-
ceived barriers might not exist in practice, perceived bar-
riers are, in their effect, real barriers since these barriers
Rooijen et al. BMC Health Services Research 2011, 11:95
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although the system is explicitly designed to create equal
opportunities to switch health insurer, some groups of
people do switch more often than others and some
groups of people do perceive more barriers than others.
These findings point towards the existence of inequalities
in the new health insurance system. The fact that some
groups of people are more afraid of not being accepted,
or think that it is not possible for them to have a com-
plementary insurance, might be interpreted as self-
selection. Therefore the role of perceived barriers in
switching behavior might play a bigger role in the future
and might lead to inequalities in switching behavior. It
is important to monitor this process, especially when dif-
ferences between insurers will occur.
Conclusion
The percentages of switchers in 2007-2009 were consid-
erably lower than the percentage of switchers in 2006
and are comparable to the number of switchers in the
old system. Switching is not based on quality considera-
tions. The question is whether the mobility of the insured
in the new health insurance system will lead to insurers
improving the quality of care offered. Although the
chronically ill and disabled and people with a bad self-
perceived health did not differ in the frequency of switch-
ing compared to others, they perceived more barriers
to switching. These findings point to the existence of
inequalities in perceived possibilities for switching in the
new health insurance system.
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